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1. Introduction
There has been a significant decline in the share of wages in GDP in both
developed and developing countries since the 1980s. This was accompa-
nied by another trend towards greater inequality in personal income distri-
bution, particularly by increases in income shares of the top 1% of the dis-
tribution.1 These developments indicate a clear reversal of the trends
towards relatively egalitarian income distribution during the post-war era.
This paper analyses the determinants of the wage share (labour compen-
sation as a ratio to value added) using sectoral data for Austria, while also
comparing our results with selected OECD countries.
Previous research has highlighted processes such as technological
change, financialisation, globalisation, changes in government policy, per-
sonal income inequality, and labour market institutions to explain the de-
cline in the wage share. Since many of those factors are either determined
on a sectoral level or have developed differently across sectors and coun-
tries, a sector-by-country analysis has several advantages over previous
research that uses country-level data or pools countries with different insti-
tutional frameworks. Furthermore, while country-level analysis always
faces the question whether the decline in the wage share captures
changes in sectoral composition rather than a decline of the wage share
within sectors, we are able to isolate the within sector development of the
wage share, and are able to abstract from changes in the sectoral compo-
sition. In fact, we find little evidence to attribute the decline in the country-
level wage share to a change in the sectoral composition of the economy,
since the wage share decreased in most of the sectors simultaneously.
We compile a comprehensive sector-level dataset of nine OECD coun-
tries (Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, the UK,
the US) for the period of 1970 to 2011,2 which allows us to trace the devel-
opments in the wage share across high and low skilled sectors and within
manufacturing and service industries. Our findings provide new insights
with regard to the drivers of falling wage share. By conducting country spe-
cific estimations, we analyse how institutional differences in industrial rela-
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tions, as well as social security and welfare regimes affect the wage share.
While Austria is the focus of our analysis in this paper, we compare our re-
sults with estimations for Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the UK,
and the US.3
We confirm previous research based on the analysis of pooled aggre-
gate county data attributing the decline in the wage share to financiali-
sation, globalisation and a decline in bargaining power of labour; however,
we find that these factors impact countries and skill groups within countries
differently. Thereby we confirm the upmost relevance of country specific
institutional setting in determining income distribution. In Austria, union
density and household debt appear to be the strongest drivers of the de-
cline in the wage share. Although we also find evidence for some negative
impact of technological change, albeit not robust, our results indicate that
the increase in income inequality is not inevitable but can be altered by po-
litical and institutional decisions.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a
short review of the theoretical literature the determinants of functional in-
come distribution from the perspective of different schools of thought as
well as an overview of the empirical literature. Section 3 introduces our
data and the stylised facts. Section 4 presents our estimation methodology
and expected results based on the theoretical considerations introduced in
section 2. Section 5 presents the estimation results and section 6 con-
cludes.
2. Literature review
The issue of increasing personal income inequality, in particular earn-
ings inequality, has attracted a significant amount of research. In contrast,
changes in functional income distribution, i. e. the fall in the share of wages
in GDP have only recently been the subject of research with an aim to pin
down the effects of technology, globalisation, and changes in the bargain-
ing power of labour. Different economic schools of thought developed dis-
tinct starting points for their analysis of functional income distribution.
The neoclassical approach, which also forms the basis for the New
Keynesian analysis, starts with a production function with two factors: cap-
ital and labour. The relative income shares of labour and capital are deter-
mined by technology. If a firm produces in a fully competitive market with
full-capacity utilisation and the production function is characterised by con-
stant elasticities of substitution between capital and labour the relative in-
come shares of the productive factors are determined by their marginal
productivity which is technologically given by the employment elasticity of
output. Hence, the focus on technological change which characterises
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many studies in the mainstream economic tradition derives directly from
their theoretical approach. There are two critical assumptions in this frame-
work: fully competitive markets and full-capacity utilisation. As soon as the
assumption of perfect competition is dropped, i. e. if firms and workers act
in oligopolistic markets as is mostly the case, relative bargaining power is
influenced by the price setting power (mark-up power) of firms.4 There is a
substantial literature in the New Keynesian tradition that derives from this.5
Empirically, this approach is most prominently represented by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (2007), the European Commission (2007), Bassa-
nini and Manfredi (2012), and Karabarbounis and Neiman (2012). Indeed
their findings indicate that technological change is the primary determinant
of falling wage shares followed by globalisation. However, Stockhammer
(2015) argues that a close examination of the reported findings reveals se-
rious robustness issues regarding the effects of technology. Indeed both
the IMF (2007) and the EC (2007) report that the technology variables are
not robust to the inclusion of time effects. However, they do not interpret
the non-robust effects of technology with caution, but rather make a strong
case that the fall in the wage share is an unavoidable outcome of techno-
logical progress.
Consistent with the nature of modern capitalist economies, the relaxation
of the assumption of full-capacity utilisation gave birth to Keynesian mac-
roeconomics which emphasise the role of effective demand in determining
output, income and employment. Consequently, functional income distri-
bution is governed by consumption of workers and capitalists and, more
importantly, by the propensity to invest which is driven by aggregate de-
mand and business expectations, i. e. the animal spirits of the private in-
vestors.6 Most heterodox authors accept this analysis but augment the
emphasis on animal spirits by additional factors governing the balance of
power between employers and employees as suggested by Marxist or
Institutionalist economists. Technology might affect the contributions of
the factors of production but technological change itself is an endogenous
outcome of conflict in the labour process. Wages are negotiated between
employers and employees and are therefore subject to social norms and
relative bargaining power. Consequently scholars in this tradition have of-
fered a more thorough analysis of the determinants of bargaining power.
Marxist economists emphasise the sphere of production as the source of
surplus and the core determinant of income distribution. Economists work-
ing in a post-Keynesian or Kaleckian tradition start directly from the as-
sumption of oligopolistic markets and focus on the sphere of circulation.
They emphasise the degree of monopoly in a market, which is deter-
mined by the degree of competition between firms, union power and, in a
more recent interpretation of the literature by the strength of the financial
sector.7
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In the following, we refer to the Marxist, Institutionalist and post-Keynes-
ian/Kaleckian analysis as the Political Economy approach.
Although the New Keynesian and the Political Economy approach to in-
come distribution start from different assumptions, both arrive at a bargain-
ing framework to analyse distribution of income, at least in the more recent
studies in the New Keynesian tradition. The difference is that the New
Keynesian approach discusses the effects in a rather technical manner
driven by a production function approach, while studies following the bar-
gaining approach would always relate the developments to changes in
bargaining power. For example, New Keynesian scholars discuss how
globalisation changed the factor supplies or costs of intermediate prod-
ucts, and how this technically affects parameters in the equation for the
wage share. In contrast, political economists rather look at how globali-
sation and financialisation increase the fall-back options of capital while
decreasing the fall-back options of labour and thereby change the relative
bargaining power between the two factors.
Both the mainstream studies and the research in the tradition of political
economy find substantial negative effects of globalisation on the wage
share. IMF (2007) and EC (2007) employ import and export prices, immi-
gration, offshoring, and trade openness (measured as export plus imports
as a ratio to value added) as measures of globalisation and find all of them
to have the expected negative effect on the wage share. However, there is
a difference in the interpretation of the results depending on the country
group used.
Publications focusing on within sector wage shares find mixed results.
Sector-level data allows to differentiate between the decline in the within-
sector wage share and a change in the sectoral composition of the econ-
omy which is an advantage over country-level data.8 Bassanini and
Manfredi (2012) fail to find a robust effect of sector specific import prices
on the wage in all but one specification and do not obtain a significant coef-
ficient for import penetration at all. They argue that the negative effect con-
firmed by country level studies result from a process of reallocation of pro-
duction towards sectors with lower wage share brought about by increas-
ing competition from abroad and confirm their hypothesis by additional es-
timations on the sectoral composition in their sample. Thereby they refer to
the “between component” of the aggregate wage share. They do find, how-
ever, a negative impact of offshoring, especially in high wage share coun-
tries, while FDI appears to be insignificant in their analysis. The negative
effect of offshoring is furthermore confirmed by Lin and Tomaskovic-
Devey (2013) for the US.
Research in the tradition of political economy confirm these results, espe-
cially with respect to trade openness variables,9 as well as intermediate im-
port penetration and outward FDI for within sector wage shares in Austria.10
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Regarding the effects of the changes in the bargaining power of labour,
the IMF (2007) and the EC (2007) both use standard indices for labour
market institutions such as union density, employment protection legisla-
tion, unemployment benefit generosity and the tax wedge designed to
measure labour market rigidities rather than to measure the bargaining
power of labour.11 EC (2007) finds that while minimum wages have a posi-
tive effect, higher employment protection legislation has negative effects
on the wage share; their interpretation of the results is that tighter employ-
ment protection legislation leads to higher bargaining power of workers
and an increase in wages, but it does not increase the wage share, since
the labour demand is very elastic. IMF (2007) finds negative effects of un-
employment benefits and the tax wedge. Numerous studies also include
direct bargaining variables such as union density, strike activity and collec-
tive bargaining regimes into their empirical analysis. Strike activity has
been found to have a positive impact on the wage share,12 while ILO
(2011) argues that collective bargaining arrangements and minimum
wages could have positive effects on the wage share. Union density is the
most commonly used variable with the best data availability and the most
robust effect. It has been found to increase the real wage13 – especially in
countries with a low level of bargaining coordination,14 reduce wage dis-
persion, and limit the size of top income shares. Additionally, stronger la-
bour unions are likely to exercise political pressure in favour of redistribu-
tion policies, thereby decreasing net income inequality (after taxes and
transfers).15 Nevertheless, it has been argued that the actual effect of un-
ions may be underestimated in empirical studies since collective bargain-
ing coverage greatly exceeds union membership in some countries. How-
ever, poor data availability limits the employability of this variable,16 at
least for the sectoral level. Stockhammer (2015) fails to find any statisti-
cally significant effect of the labour market institution variables such as em-
ployment protection legislation, minimum wages, unemployment benefit
replacement ratio, unemployment benefit duration, and the tax wedge.
The mainstream literature does not control for the effects of welfare state
retrenchment or financialisation. In the political economy literature, welfare
state retrenchment is found to be an important determinant of the fall in the
wage share;17 however the measure used is often only aggregate govern-
ment spending as a ratio to GDP, and is too broad to reflect the details of
the welfare reforms essential to the bargaining power of labour. Kristal
(2012) uses government civilian spending, which nevertheless does not
capture the details of spending that is particularly important for the social
wage and bargaining power of labour such as public spending on social
protection or health and education.
There have been only few studies investigating the impact of financiali-
sation on functional income distribution. The term is not unambiguously
561
42. Jahrgang (2016), Heft 4 Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft
defined, but encompasses the “increased role of financial activity and ris-
ing prominence of financial institutions”.18 Financialisation gained momen-
tum since the 1980s. Similar to globalisation, it has increased the “exit op-
tions” for capital which can now be invested in real as well as financial
assets.19 Furthermore, it has been argued that financialisation changed in-
dustrial relations and led to a “shareholder value orientation” as a conse-
quence of hostile takeovers of listed companies.20 Financialised firms
adopt a “downsize and distribute” strategy, which reduces prospects for la-
bour to agree on a beneficial compromise. Similarly, the self-perception of
workers changed due to financialisation, resulting in an emergence of “in-
vestor identities”.21 The main indicators of financialisation applied are fi-
nancial globalisation calculated as foreign assets plus liabilities,22 current
account openness,23 and dividend and interest payments and income.24
Interestingly, all studies obtain a significant negative effect of at least one
of those variables. Kohler, Guschanski and Stockhammer (2016) offer a
systematic analysis of different channels through which financialisation af-
fects the wage share including all of these measure and augmenting them
by variables measuring the competition on capital markets (stock market
turnover ratio) and household debt. They find the latter variable to be most
significant for the determination of the wage share among all financiali-
sation variables as well as control variables. The only study on within sec-
tor wage shares including a measure of financialisation is Lin and Tomas-
kovic-Devey (2013) who account for the ratio of financial receipts of non-
financial corporations (including interest, dividend and capital gains) to
business receipts for the case of the US. The only paper, to the best of our
knowledge, investigating the effect of financialisation on the wage share
using firm level data is Alvarez (2015) who includes net financial income
and interest payments as explanatory variables in his analysis of France.
Summing up, the research based on a political economy approach uses
aggregate country level panel data, which does not differentiate the results
across skill groups and industries. Within the mainstream literature, which
argues the primacy of technological change, Bassanini and Manfredi
(2012) and Karabarbounis and Neiman (2012) use sectoral as well as
country panel data; however they do not explicitly control for variables
which would reflect the bargaining power of labour and labour market insti-
tutions, welfare state retrenchment or financialisation. IMF (2007) at-
tempts to distinguish the effects on the wage share of the workers in the
skilled and unskilled industries; however the study claims that the income
share of skilled workers rose by focusing on the share of wage bill in the in-
dustries using predominantly skilled labour as a ratio to the economy wide
value added, rather than the share of wages in the skilled sectors as a ratio
to the value added in those sectors, which is also mentioned in a figure in
the paper. According to the latter indicator, which is reported but not dis-
562
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 42. Jahrgang (2016), Heft 4
cussed in the IMF study, the labour share of skilled workers is also falling in
some major economies. Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey (2013) and Onaran
(2011, 2012) are closest to our analysis, but while these studies focus on a
single country, the US and Austria respectively, we perform our analysis
for selected OECD countries and are therefore able to account for country
specific differences in industrial relations. Furthermore, we incorporate a
broader range of explanatory variables.
3. Data and stylised facts
3.1 Data
We have compiled a comprehensive database for nine OECD econo-
mies drawing on six publicly available international databases for sectoral
data which we augmented by country level data.25
We measure the wage share as labour compensation as a ratio to value
added with data obtained from the EU KLEMS database. Labour compen-
sation includes the wage of self-employed workers, imputed based on the
assumption that their wage is equal to the average hourly wage of the sec-
tor.26 Since data from EU KLEMS is only available until 2009 we extrapo-
late through splicing. More specifically, we link the wage share from
KLEMS with the growth rate of the wage share obtained from the OECD
Structural Analysis database (OECD STAN).27 Both series have a correla-
tion of 0.91. We control for violent swings in the wage share by excluding
years where the percentage change in the wage share exceeds 30% in ab-
solute values, which mostly appear in Denmark, the UK and Sweden, but
our results are robust to all these cleaning procedures.
In order to see how our results differ if we use the after-tax wage share as
the dependent variable in our estimations we had to obtain measures for
implicit tax rates on labour income, indicating the share of taxes paid out of
wage income. The series are not readily available for many countries and
for long periods; therefore we reconstructed the series using the technique
proposed by Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000) with data from several
sources of the OECD database.
We obtain measures of capital stock from the EU KLEMS database. Un-
fortunately only aggregated capital stock data is available at the 2-digit
level.28 We extrapolate capital stock from KLEMS using the growth rate of
the same measure from STAN. At the 1-digit level we are able to dis-
aggregate ICT and non-ICT capital. ICT and non-ICT capital is reported as
services (measured as an index) rather than stock in the newer versions of
KLEMS.
Our globalisation variables are obtained from the OECD. Import data
disaggregated for intermediate import and other imports is from OECD
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STAN Bilateral Trade Database by Industry and End-Use Category. We
calculate the ratio of intermediate and other imports to domestic absorp-
tion, i. e. value added plus total exports minus total imports of the sector.29
FDI is taken from the OECD FDI statistics database and measures FDI
positions (stocks) as assets minus liabilities of all parent companies to
their affiliates.30 We normalise the measure by the numbers of people en-
gaged in the sector, which we consider to have advantage over other
forms of normalization for two reasons: First, since we are interested in the
effect of FDI on industrial relations, a normalisation by people engaged in
the production process seems reasonable. Second, since FDI is mea-
sured as a stock it is preferable to normalise it by another stock variable
and not a flow variable like value added or output.
Our measure of migration is the stock of foreign labour by nationality taken
from the OECD and we splice it with the growth rate of foreign population for
the years for which data is not available (in line with IMF, 2007).31 We in-
clude it in our estimations as a ratio to total employment of the country.
Finally, for robustness tests we use an aggregate index of economic
globalisation supplied by Dreher (2006) and updated in Dreher, et al.
(2008), which combines de facto data from trade flows, FDI stocks, portfo-
lio investment, income payments to foreign nationals with de jure measure
of hidden import barriers, tariff rates, taxes on international trade and capi-
tal account restrictions.
Our only measures for labour market institutions available at the sectoral
level is union density supplied by Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000) and
Visser (2015). Data is only available on an aggregated level of sectoral
classification and not available for each year. Therefore, we interpolate the
series between available years and extrapolate data for service sectors
using the growth rate of country-level union density. Similarly, we extrapo-
late manufacturing sectors using the growth rate of the total manufacturing
union density or country-level union density when the latter series was not
available. Due to the large amount of data created by extra- or interpola-
tion we have reasons to doubt the reliability of this variable, although this is
more relevant for earlier years before 1995 which are included only in a
limited number of our estimations. However, it is important to note that
such interpolation smoothens the data and thereby diminishes its ability to
capture short-time adjustment in bargaining variables in reaction to certain
political or economic events. Nevertheless, we think the results are indica-
tive and important as this paper is the first attempt to analyse the impact of
union density on sectoral wage share for several countries. We also check
for robustness by using the country level aggregate union density variable
supplied by the OECD. Our second measure of bargaining power is ad-
justed bargaining coverage32 measuring the number of employees cov-
ered by collective (wage) bargaining agreements as a proportion of all
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wage and salary earners in employment with the right to bargaining.33 This
variable is only available at the country level.
Furthermore, we account for social government spending defined as so-
cial transfers in kind from government to households measuring expendi-
ture by government on market goods and services provided to households
such as health care, housing, recreational and cultural services, education
and social protection. This measure excludes social transfers in cash (re-
flecting welfare benefits), which we add to the previous measure for ro-
bustness tests. The variable is measured as percentage of GDP and ob-
tained from the OECD National Accounts at a Glance database.
Furthermore we include the Gini-coefficient obtained from the “Stan-
dardized World Income Inequality Database”,34 and top 1 percent income
shares from the “World Wealth and Income Database”.35
Our country-level financialisation variables include interest and dividend
payments and income of nonfinancial corporations as a ratio to total re-
sources of nonfinancial corporations obtained from the OECD Non-finan-
cial Accounts by Sectors Database which is part of the Annual Accounts
statistics. Furthermore we augment our analysis by a variable measuring
household debt as percentage of GDP from the Bank of International Set-
tlements Total Credit Statistics.
3.2 Stylised Facts
While the decline in the aggregate country-level labour share is a well-
documented fact, there is only limited analysis of dynamics in functional in-
come distribution at the sectoral level. We find that the trend observed in
the aggregate country level wage share is mirrored at the sectoral level, al-
beit with important differences between manufacturing and services sec-
tors as well as high (HS) and low skilled (LS) sector groups and across
countries as can be seen in Figure 1 below for selected countries.
In Austria we observe one of the steepest declines in the wage share in
comparison to other European countries. The wage share in value added
of the sector is generally higher in the manufacturing industries than in ser-
vices until the late 1990s, after which the wage share in manufacturing falls
below the wage share in the service sectors. This pattern is unique to Aus-
tria – most other countries exhibit a higher wage share in low skilled ser-
vice industries than in manufacturing as can be seen in France, Germany
and the UK – and can well be related to imputed wages of owner entrepre-
neurs.
Within manufacturing sectors in Austria low skilled sectors maintained
the highest share of wages in value added in the economy until the mid-
1980s, but also exhibit the sharpest decline amongst all sector groups by
27 percentage-points from 85 percent to 58 percent between 1978 and
42. Jahrgang (2016), Heft 4 Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft
565
Figure 1: Wage share in Austria, France, Germany and the UK
Source: Own calculations; see Section 3.1 for detailed sources. Data excludes the “Agricul-
ture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing” sector.
2007. Interestingly, this trend is mirrored by the other sectors so that low
skill manufacturing never falls below high skilled manufacturing which ex-
perienced a reduction of the wage share by 21 percentage-points between
1980 and 2008, a period which was marked by high scale privatisation
practises. The wage share in high skilled service sectors declined rela-
tively less in comparison to the rest of the economy, but with a decrease by
14 percentage-points between 1970 and 2007 the reduction in the share of
wages in these sectors is still substantial.
During the same time employment composition between sectors (mea-
sured as people engaged to include self-employed) changed drastically.
The general trend is a decrease in the employment of low skilled sectors
while employment in the high skilled sectors increased. In order to isolate
the effect of a change in employment on the wage share, we further calcu-
lated labour shares for a constant level of employment between its peak
and bottom point in Austria.36 While the change in people engaged ac-
counted for 89% of the decline in the wage share for low skilled manufac-
turing sectors in Austria, a significant part of the decline remains unex-
plained. This figure is even more dramatic for the other sectors: change in
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employment explains only 30% of the decrease in the wage share of low
skilled service sectors, while employment in high skilled manufacturing
and services increased and even more than doubled for high skill service
sectors.
The dynamics of the other countries in our sample are very diverse.37
The wage share in France exhibits the strongest skill bias amongst the four
countries. However, the only sector group characterised by a slightly in-
creasing wage share is high skilled manufacturing, while other sectors
have lost out in comparison to their own position in the 1980s. In Germany
the wage share appears to be quite stable until the early 2000s, which
marks the implementation of the Hartz reforms – one of the most drastic la-
bour market policy packages to be implemented in Germany. Thereafter
all sector groups besides high skilled services exhibit a strong decline in
the wage share. In the UK low skilled services experienced a steady re-
duction in the wage share since the mid-1990s, while low skilled manufac-
turing sectors have increased their wage share in the same period, al-
though they still lost out in relation to their position in the early 1980s.
Turning to high skilled sectors, services show the most steady wage share,
which experienced a sharp decline by 9 percentage-points between 1984
and 1994 and afterwards stabilised at a lower level.
Looking at the crisis year shows some interesting dynamics. Unfortu-
nately, our data quality is worse for those years given that we are employ-
ing an unbalanced panel and thereby face the risk of sectors dropping out
of our sample at the beginning and end of the time period. Nevertheless we
can observe some interesting dynamics. Historically, the wage share
tends to rise during recessions as companies hold on to workers and pro-
ductivity falls more than real wages, then the wage share falls back in a re-
covery. But during the 2008 recession the labour share did the opposite in
some countries: it fell soon after the initial year of the recession, and when
the recovery began the aggregate wage share kept falling in most coun-
tries. This trend can clearly be observed in in the US, Austria, France and
Germany. Unfortunately our sectoral data for the UK is limited and ends in
2009, but nevertheless we can observe a decline for manufacturing sec-
tors in the last years of the sample while service sectors exhibit an in-
crease between 2008 and 2009; also the data for the aggregate economy
which is available until 2015 confirms these trends.
Summing up, despite the diversity of wage share dynamics across coun-
tries and sector groups, there are no sectors which seem to be exempt
from the rise in inequality in functional income distribution across coun-
tries, an observation which cast doubt on two most commonly used expla-
nations to account for the decrease in the country-level wage share in the
mainstream analysis. On the one hand, there is reason to question the ar-
gument of skill-biased technological change as the main driver of func-
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tional income inequality, since it predicts an increase in the wage share of
skilled workers while the wage share of unskilled workers declines. If our
sectoral skill disaggregation roughly reflects the share of skilled and un-
skilled workers we can decisively conclude that this trend is not apparent
the OECD countries. In Austria labour in all sectors of the economy has
lost compared to capital. On the other hand, several economists have at-
tributed the decline of the country-level wage share to a change in the sec-
toral composition of the economy, maintaining that the observed decline is
mainly the result of traditionally capital intensive sectors with a low wage
share producing an increasing share of overall value added.38 Although
our observation of an overall decline in the wage share across skill groups
does not invalidate this explanation, it nevertheless provides evidence that
changing industrial composition cannot on its own explain the decline in
the aggregate wage share. This confirms previous findings by Karabar-
bounis and Neiman (2012, 2014) and Rodriguez and Jayadev (2010).
Therefore the analysis of the causes of the decline in the wage share re-
mains an important question which cannot be merely attributed to technol-
ogy driven changes in the sectoral composition of the economy.
Regarding the remaining variables in our sample, our measures of globali-
sation show a similar pattern across all countries. Intermediate import pen-
etration increased in all countries in both high and low skilled manufactur-
ing sectors.39 The highest total growth rates were achieved in the 1990s in
Sweden and Germany, driven by high skilled manufacturing sectors which
in general have a higher level of intermediate imports than low skilled man-
ufacturing sectors. A similar pattern can be observed for outward foreign
direct investment (FDI). Here we can see a strong skill bias in the sense
that outward FDI per employee increased more for high skilled manufac-
turing and service sectors than for their low skilled counterparts in Austria,
France, Germany and the US while the other countries experienced a rather
balanced increase in outward FDI across sectors. The exceptions are al-
ways low-skilled service sectors which experience the least amount of out-
ward FDI. The share of migrant workers in the total labour force has been
increasing in most countries with the noticeable exceptions of Sweden,
where it has stagnated, and France where it declined. Nevertheless, the
share of migrants is very small in all countries, exceeding ten percent only
for Austria where it reaches 12 and the US where data is not comparable
because it is measured as foreign-born rather than foreign labour force.
The share of ICT capital in value added is usually applied as a measure
of technological change in the literature. We observe a steady increase in
the share of ICT capital measures across all sectors and countries. There
is a slight bias in favour of high skilled sectors in Austria, the UK and the
US, but the general positive and sometimes even exponential trend is
common to all countries.
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We observe a strong decline in union density for all sector groups in Aus-
tria, France, Germany, the UK and the US, while the decline is more mod-
erate, albeit still visible, in Italy, Denmark and Sweden. Union density stag-
nated or even increased in Spain between 1980 and 2010, however not
exceeding the comparatively low level of 20 percent.40 In most countries
union density began to decrease in the 1980s, with the exception of Aus-
tria, France and the US where it has been declining since the 1970s. Union
density is highest in manufacturing sectors and lowest in low skilled ser-
vice sectors. However, the latter group is also characterised by the small-
est reduction in union density. Comparing countries amongst each other
union density measured at the country level declined most strongly in Aus-
tria where we observe a reduction by 35 percentage-points between 1970
and 2011, followed by the UK and Germany where the reduction consti-
tutes 24 and 18 percentage-points respectively.
Adjusted collective bargaining coverage also falls in most countries. The
most drastic reductions in bargaining coverage can be observed in the UK,
Germany and the US where it declined by 48, 27 and 18 percentage-points
between the 1970 and the 2010s.
We observe an increase in social government spending in our sample
period in most countries with the exception of Sweden and Denmark
where the measure stayed roughly constant. Interestingly, while social
government spending increased or stagnated, it’s financing is more relying
on workers income as can be observed by the increasing implicit tax rates
for labour and consumption for all our sample.41
Personal inequality measured by the Gini coefficient increased in most
countries with regard to its level in the 1980s, with France as the only out-
standing exception. A similar pattern can be observed for the income
share of the top 1 percent, this time Denmark being the exception from the
rule of increasing top income shares.
4. Estimation Methodology
Our basic specification of the within sector wage share has the following
form:
WSi,t = αi + αgGROWTHi,t + αkKnonICTi,t + αkictKICTi,t +
+ αbargBARGAININGi,t + αglobGLOBALi,t + αwelfareWELFAREt +
+ αfinancialFINANCIALISATIONt + αineqINEQUALITYt + i,t Equation (3)
where i is the sector index, t is the time index, and WS is the wage share in
sector i. GROWTH is the first difference of value added of the sector in
order to control for the counter-cyclical dynamics of the wage share. KICT
and KnonICT are ICT (information and communication technology) and
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non-ICT capital services as a ratio to value added in sector i; these capture
the effects of technological change. is a sector specific coefficient. We do
not include period effects in our baseline estimation since several of our
bargaining variables are only available on the country level and are
thereby statistically similar to year dummies while carrying more meaning-
ful information.
GLOBAL is a set of variables which capture the effects of globalisation,
such as intermediate import penetration and inward and outward FDI in-
tensity. Intermediate import penetration is clearly linked to the wage share
insofar as intermediate imports are related to the process of outsourcing to
foreign companies. However, our data for intermediate imports is based
on the conversion of commodity indices to sector indices and thereby
doesn’t allow us to calculate how much of the imported product is actually
used by each sector, which would constitute a more precise outsourcing
measure and requires the use of input-output tables. However, assuming
that the use of imported goods stays relatively constant across sectors in-
termediate import penetration is a relevant measure for the reallocation of
production abroad. We expect a negative effect on the wage share for low
skilled sectors in capital abundant countries (as high-income OECD coun-
tries are usually assumed to be), brought about either by downward pres-
sure on wages to maintain competitiveness, through trade-induced labour-
saving technological change, or a reallocation of employment abroad or
towards more capital-intensive sectors in the economy.42 The expected ef-
fect for high skilled sectors is more ambiguous, given that imports can also
increase output if they are complementary to domestic production or re-
duce costs. The effect is theoretically even more ambiguous if one consid-
ers imports of final goods that are not produced domestically.43 Depending
on which factor is the most dominant, effects are likely to differ across
countries.
We focus on outward FDI since it is clearly linked to developments in the
wage share while the effect of inward FDI is more ambiguous, and less rel-
evant for developed economies. Furthermore, estimations with inward FDI
didn’t change our results for outward FDI and the coefficient was not ro-
bust. We generally expect the effect of outward FDI to vary across manu-
facturing and services and potentially across skill groups. FDI is generally
classified into two categories: vertical or cost-seeking FDI leads to substi-
tution of domestic, usually low skilled workers by foreign labour, thereby
creating negative employment effects in the home country while also in-
creasing intermediate imports. However, there might be a positive scale
effect related to vertical FDI if it increases exports through cost advantages
or for production purposes in foreign affiliates. Additionally, cost-seeking
FDI might have an impact on the factor composition since the type of jobs
created abroad are potentially of a low skilled nature, thereby lowering the
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wage share of low skilled domestic workers and increasing it for high
skilled workers. Furthermore, vertical FDI potentially induce downward
pressure on wages as foreign workers can be argued to increase labour
demand at lower wage rates. This channel is most likely to impact both
skilled and unskilled workers alike. Horizontal, or market-seeking FDI can
also have a negative effect to the extent that it replaces exports. More
likely though it will have a positive effect for high skilled workers because of
an increase in employment at headquarters situated in the home coun-
try.44 Generally, we expect these effects to be less pronounced in services
because of their non-tradable character.
Furthermore we test the robustness of our results with regard to globali-
sation with country-level variables like the KOF globalisation index sup-
plied by Dreher (2006) and Dreher, et al. (2008). These controls, which are
important because the variable constitutes an exogenous measure of
globalisation, strongly confirm our results with sector level variables.45
Our final variable accounting for trends in globalisation is the share of mi-
grant workers in total employment. Previous findings suggest the effect of
migration on the wage share to be negligible.46 Theoretically, it can be ei-
ther positive or negative depending on whether foreign workers comple-
ment domestic workers and thereby increase productivity or replace do-
mestic workers while receiving a lower wage (or lower social security
contributions).
BARGAINING is a set of variables related to the industrial relations and
labour market institutions including union density (alternately at the coun-
try and sector level) and adjusted collective bargaining coverage at the
country level. While union density measures “potential union bargaining
pressure”, “the effectiveness of unions in providing and defending mini-
mum standards of income and employment” is argued to be better cap-
tured by bargaining coverage defined as employees covered by collective
(wage) bargaining agreements as a proportion of all wage and salary earn-
ers in employment with the right to bargaining.47 Furthermore we experi-
mented with a measure of minimum wages as a ratio to the sectoral aver-
age wage as well as the growth rate of real minimum wages. Theoretically,
an increase in any of those measures is expected to increase the real
wage which will lead to an increase in the wage share if the elasticity of
substitution between capital and labour is less than unity.
FINANCIALISATION includes interest and dividend payments and in-
come as a ratio to total resources of nonfinancial corporations, as well as
household debt as a share of GDP at the country level. There are different
channels through which financialisation is said to impact the wage share.
Post-Keynesian literature emphasises the effect of financial payments of
non-financial corporations and relate it to an increase in the mark-up of
employers if the latter is cost-sensitive with respect to financial pay-
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ments.48 Alternatively one could argue that dividend payments are an indi-
cation of increasing “shareholder value” orientation, inducing a “downsize
and distribute” strategy that will supress wages and employment.49 House-
hold debt has been found to reduce wage share arguably through increas-
ing financial vulnerability that has an adverse effect on workers’ willing-
ness to engage in collective action.50
WELFARE is social government spending at the individual level as ex-
plained in the previous section. This variable is measured at the country
level and is the same for all sectors.
INEQUALITY is country level inequality measured as the Gini coefficient
or the income share of the top one percentile, again the same for all sec-
tors.
We apply two main estimation techniques. Our baseline estimation is
performed using the within estimator (also referred to as Fixed Effects Esti-
mator), while we estimate the variance-covariance-matrix of the remainder
error term using the approach developed by Driscoll and Kraay (1998).
Therefore, standard errors are fully robust with respect to serial correlation
within countries, cross-sectional correlation across sectors as well as gen-
eral heteroscedasticity. Our main robustness controls are conducted with
a first difference estimator. This has the additional advantage that potential
non-stationarity concerns are taken care of given that all our variables are
unambiguously stationary in first differences.51
Since there is reason for concerns regarding the endogeneity and specif-
ically reverse causality for our measures of technological change and
globalisation, and because the effect of other variables will most likely be
manifested with a time lag, all explanatory variables enter the equation
with a lag. It would be preferable to employ a General Method of Moments
estimator to tackle the issue of endogeneity as well as the dynamic nature
of the wage share. However, due to the limited number of cross sections in
our single country estimations this estimation method is not appropriate.
With regards to endogeneity concerns we employ the second best ap-
proach by using lagged values of the explanatory variables.52 In addition to
the pool of all sectors, separate regression analysis will be performed for
sector groups disaggregated as high skilled and low skilled sectors in man-
ufacturing and services separately.
In separate regressions we employ four alternative measures of the
wage share for robustness check: i) the after tax wage share calculated as
explained in the previous section; ii) compensation of employees as a ratio
to value added, i. e. the wage share without the adjustment for self-em-
ployed workers; iii) wages and salaries as a ratio to value added – this is a
measure of primary market distribution since it excludes all redistribution
measures including social security contributions; iv) a sample without the
outliers in which we drop all observations where the wage share exceed 1.
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If not otherwise mentioned in the text our baseline results are confirmed by
these robustness tests.
We aim at using our variables at the most disaggregated level for which
data are available. While our dependent variable is available at the two
digit level of ISIC 4 (International Standard Industrial Classification of All
Economic Activities), most of our explanatory variables are available at the
1-digit level with the exception of total capital stock and intermediate im-
port penetration which are available at a 2-digit level. For this reason we
switch between the two and one digit level according to the specification as
explained in the next section.
Estimation period differs due to data availability depending on the vari-
ables used in each specification and country. While data for the wage
share at sectoral level is available for 1970-2011, the data for the FDI
starts only in 1985 and detailed data on imports disaggregated as interme-
diate and final imports starts in 1995. The estimation period for Austria and
most other countries is 1996-2010 for specifications including intermediate
imports and 1986-2010 for specifications including FDI, with the exception
of Denmark where our sample finishes in 2011. Furthermore, data for our
measures of financialisation starts in 1995 for Austria and most other
countries with the exception of France where data is available from 1970. It
is mostly data on the capital stock that constrains the last year of our sam-
ple period, although for same countries, like the US, data for the sector-
level wage share also ends in 2010.
We exclude the Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing, and Mining
and Quarrying sectors as well as mostly publicly owned sectors (Public
Administration and Defence, Compulsory Social Security, Education,
Human Health and Social Work Activities) from the reported estimations,
as these sectors’ wage setting behaviour may constitute an outlier and
may not be determined by the same forces as in other sectors, but results
are robust to the inclusion of these sectors.
5. Estimation Results
Table 1 shows estimation results for Austria for the total sector pool,
while the reader is referred to Guschanski and Onaran (2016a) for estima-
tion differentiated by skill group and manufacturing and service sectors.
We estimate specifications (1) to (3) at the 2-digit level while specifica-
tions (4) to (8) is estimated at the 1-digit level. We separately estimate the
effect of increasing import penetration and outward FDI on the wage
share, while controlling for union density and individual government
spending at the country level in specifications (1) to (6). To avoid multicolli-
nearity we estimate specifications with union density and government
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spending separately and exclude union density from specifications (7) and
(8) since it’s strongly correlated with other country-level variables (nega-
tive correlation below –0.9 for Austria).
We find robust significantly negative effects of globalisation, measured
by intermediate import penetration and outward FDI on the wage share in
specifications (1) to (6), while the effect of the variables accounting for
technological change is not robust and does not always have the expected
sign: total capital stock as a ratio to value added is insignificant in all speci-
fications while when capital is disaggregated as ICT and non-ICT capital,
ICT capital services as a ratio to value added has a negative effect and
non-ICT capital services as a ratio to value added has a positive effect.
With regard to the control variables at the country level, we find a positive
but not robust effect of union density, while social government spending
turns out to be insignificant for the determination of the wage share in Aus-
tria. We furthermore include two specifications augmented by additional
variables measuring migration, financialisation and person income in-
equality.53 Among our financialisation variables, household debt and finan-
cial income and payments are significantly negative and robust to changes
in the sample when the first difference estimator is applied. Furthermore
we find positive effects of the share of migrant workers in total labour force
and negative effects of the Gini coefficient although the statistical signifi-
cance of these two variables varies.
Besides robustness tests using different estimation techniques and dif-
ferent measures of the wage share as described in section 3, we estimated
our specifications for different sub-pools, i. e. only manufacturing or only
service sectors, as well as for high- and low skilled sectors within manufac-
turing and services separately. This not only allows us to test the robust-
ness of our results, but at the same time provides insights with regards to
the variables that have potentially contrasting effects for manufacturing
and services or across skill groups. However, since our cross sections are
limited to 20 sectors for the 1-digit level estimations the estimations across
skill groups can only provide indicative evidence.
5.1 Globalisation
Among our globalisation variables intermediate import penetration ap-
pears to have a negative impact on the wage share across all skill groups
within the manufacturing sectors given that it is negative and significant for
high and low skilled sectors alike. In the services sectors our data for inter-
mediate import penetration is limited to one sector (recycling), but our re-
sults for the total economy are robust to the exclusion of this sector. This
finding is also robust when different estimation methodologies are used.
Intermediate import penetration is significant in specifications (1) to (3)
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when estimated in first differences. The fact that intermediate import pene-
tration has a robust negative effect across all skill groups suggests that
outsourcing of intermediate production may have harmed blue and white
collar workers alike in Austria.
Outward FDI, equally negative and robust in our estimation for the total
sample as intermediate import penetration, appears to have different ef-
fects across industry types. It has a negative and statistically significant ef-
fect in manufacturing as a whole as well as in low skilled manufacturing
sectors, but the effect turns positive in high skilled manufacturing when the
financialisation variables are included. For total service sectors its overall
effect is positive for all specifications and statistically significant for specifi-
cation (4). Although this effect appears to be driven mainly by high skilled
services sectors, outward FDI is not robust to the inclusion of financiali-
sation variables and switches its sign. Our measure of FDI is the variable
for which we are most concerned about non-stationarity as our unit root
test indicate that it is likely to be integrated of order one. Therefore we pre-
fer to rely on the estimations in first differences for the analysis of outward
FDI. In these specifications, FDI has the same negative effect for total
manufacturing sectors while it is positive but statistically insignificant for
total services. While the effect of FDI in manufacturing is driven by high
and low skilled sectors alike when measured in first differences, the posi-
tive sign in services is not present for any of the sub-samples of high or low
skilled service sectors. Generally, it is plausible that there is a skill bias cre-
ating a higher demand for high skilled labour through outward FDI if it is of
a vertical (cost-seeking) nature. It is also plausible that this effect is less
strong in non-tradable service sectors with a more horizontal market seek-
ing nature. Other mechanisms like the threat effects associated with a
change in the fall back options for capital and labour are also expected to
be less important for high skill labour and services than low-skill labour and
manufacturing.54 Our results confirm the different effects for services and
manufacturing, although the fact that we fail to find a positive effect for high
skilled manufacturing or a robust positive effect for high skilled services
suggest that the potential beneficial effects are outweighed by the threat
effects or substitution effects even for high skilled workers.
The share of migrant workers in total labour force has a robust and posi-
tive effect on the wage share for the manufacturing sectors and the total
pool as is robust to different estimation methods. For service sectors the
coefficient is insignificant with the exception of high skilled services where
migration becomes significant. The positive sign suggests that migrant
workers are on average complementary to domestic workers in Austria,
thereby increasing the productivity and the wage share.
To sum up there is strong evidence of a negative effect of globalisation
on the wage share in Austria. This effect is realised via an increase in inter-
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mediate imports and outward FDI and affects all sectors and skill groups
with the potential exception of service sectors in the case of FDI. The neg-
ative effect of globalisation does not result from the increase of the migrant
share of the labour force – on the contrary migration has a positive effect in
Austria which points to the fact that migrant workers are complementary to
domestic workers.
5.2 Technology
Our technology variables aim to capture the effect of skill-biased techno-
logical change on the wage share. We fail to find evidence for the main-
stream hypothesis that technological change will decrease the wage share
of low skilled workers and increase it for high skilled workers.55 Indeed for
Austria technological change embodied in the accumulation of ICT capital
exercises a negative effect on workers in both the skilled and unskilled in-
dustries, although the effect is not robust in all samples. This finding is in
line with the development of the wage share in Austria which shows a neg-
ative trend for all skill groups for manufacturing and service sectors alike,
while the share of ICT capital also increased across all sectors. Curiously,
the share of non-ICT capital has a positive effect on the wage share in
most specifications, highlighting its labour augmenting nature, while it be-
comes insignificant in some other specifications. Again, no structural dif-
ference can be seen for the effect on high or low skilled industries.
A further interesting highlight of our findings indicate that ICT and non-
ICT capital services become insignificant when included in an estimation
with country-level financialisation variables, while some of our financiali-
sation variables are significant for manufacturing industries applying the
within estimator. The results also hold for estimations in first differences
especially with respect to ICT capital, the main measure for skill-biased
technological change.56 This result appears to be similar to EC (2007) who
report that variables for technological change are not robust to the inclu-
sion of time effects. Our country-level variables are similar to period fixed
effects given that they are the same across sectors and differ by year, but
they carry much more specific information than a general time effect.
Stockhammer (2015) also find that financial globalisation is the main driver
of the wage share based on panel data estimations using country level (not
sectoral) data. However, these results can only be seen as indicative and
require further analysis, preferably with measures of financialisation at the
level of disaggregation of the dependent variable, which can be done only
using firm level data as in Guschanski and Onaran (forthcoming). Interest-
ingly, we obtain the same effect when we use wages and salaries as a ratio
to value added as a dependent variable. This alternative dependent vari-
able, which is equal to our wage share excluding social security contribu-
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tion paid by employers to employees, is a better measure of primary mar-
ket distribution since it excludes secondary distribution.
5.3 Country-level variables
With regard to the control variables, union density has a positive effect
on the wage share in specification (3) – indeed it is highly significant and
renders the effect of intermediate import penetration insignificant. The ef-
fect of union density is however not robust at the 1-digit level in specifica-
tion (6).57 The result is confirmed for sub-pools of manufacturing indus-
tries. However, given that the variable is measured at the country level, the
reliability of the estimation results by sub-pools is questionable. In order to
obtain at least indicative results with union density measured at the sec-
toral level we performed robustness tests with union density measured at
the sector level regardless of our concerns about its reliability as men-
tioned in section 3. In general results for sectoral union density confirm the
results for country-level union density. The positive but not robust impact
of union density is generally driven by all sector and skill groups. Further-
more, we experimented with adjusted bargaining as an alternative mea-
sure for workers bargaining power. However, given that bargaining cover-
age stayed at a constant level since the 1970s in Austria the variable
created multicollinearity with our fixed effects and we had to drop it.
Social government spending turns out to be insignificant or positive for
almost all specifications with the exception of estimations for the high
skilled manufacturing sectors only where we find an unexpected negative
sign for specifications (7) and (8). Nevertheless, like union density, social
government spending becomes insignificant for most estimations in first
differences, while it is positive for service sectors.
Since there are no measures of financialisation at the sectoral level we
can only use country-level variables among which household debt and fi-
nancial payments appear to have a robust negative effect, albeit mostly for
estimations in first differences. This finding is robust to the application of
different samples, although the highest statistical significance is achieved
for the high-skilled manufacturing sector. Similarly we find a negative ef-
fect of household debt for the manufacturing sector for the estimations in
levels, in both low and high skilled manufacturing sectors alike. Given that
lower income workers might be credit constrained and that the recent
surge in household debt was mainly driven by the upper-middle class this
result seems plausible. It is not entirely clear, however, why workers in the
high-skilled manufacturing sector should be stronger affected by house-
hold debt than workers in the high skilled service sector.
Our specification (8) reflects the argument that personal income inequal-
ity is an indicator of the command over resources and power relations,
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hence we include the Gini coefficient in our set of explanatory variables.
We find no statistically significant effect, however, we consider the income
share of the top 1% to be a better measure for personal income distribution
than the Gini coefficient, because it captures the tail of the distribution
where most of the increase in income inequality happened, while the Gini
coefficient is rather in-sensitive to changes in the tails. Furthermore, we
have less concern in the case of the income share of the top 1% with re-
gard to endogeneity that naturally arises between a measure of functional
and personal income distribution that captures the whole population like
the Gini coefficient. Unfortunately there is no data on the income share of
the top 1% for Austria in The World Wealth and Income Database which is
why we revert to using the Gini for Austria, while we experiment with top in-
come shares for the remaining countries in our sample.
5.4 After tax wage share
Our estimation result for the after tax wage share as the dependent vari-
able strongly confirms our initial results for our main variables, although
the statistical significance of household debt is increased.58 Intermediate
imports, outward FDI and union density have the same effect across differ-
ent samples. This implies that the effect of intermediate imports, outward
FDI and union density is similarly relevant for after tax wage share as for
the before tax wage share.
5.5 Economic effects
Finally, we report the economic significance of our variables for a specifi-
cation including intermediate import penetration and union density (speci-
fication [3]) as well as a specification including all other variables (specifi-
cation [8]) in Table 2. More precisely, we calculate the predicted change in
the dependent variable based on individual covariates by multiplying the
estimation coefficient of the respective explanatory variable with the cross-
sectional average change of that variable over the sample period and di-
viding by the change in the wage share.59, 60
The decline in the wage share, taken as an average over the two specifi-
cations, is 8.7 percentage points, similar to the decline in the country level
wage share which constituted 6.6 percentage points. Based on the estima-
tion with union density (specification [3]) we find that union density had the
strongest impact in Austria, explaining 85.1 percent of the average decline
of the wage share. Increasing imports of capital and consumption goods
and the increase in capital intensity have had a sizeable positive effects.
Capital intensity had the second highest positive impact, predicting 16.5 of
the change in the wage share. Based on specification (8) we find a sizeab-
le negative effect of household debt and, albeit much smaller in size, of ICT
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capital intensity. Results indicate that migration had a strong positive effect
on the wage share.
Table 2: Economic significance of coefficients for selected
specifications for Austria
Method explanatory var*coeff explanatory var*coeff
Specification Based on Table 1,
Specification (3)
Based on Table 1,
Specification (8)
growth –0.002 –0.005
capital stock 0.017
int. imports –0.008
other imports 0.006
social government 0.001
total union density –0.093
ICT capital –0.023
non-ICT capital –0.009
outward FDI –0.0003
household debt –0.102
fin. Income –0.017
fin. payments –0.009
migration 0.122
gini 0.001
Period 1996-2007 1996-2007
∆Wage Share –0.106 –0.068
Notes: Columns 2 and 4 report coefficients for our sample based on estimates from specifi-
cation (3) and (8) in Table 1 respectively multiplied by the change in the variable. Columns
3 and 5 report the predicted change in the wage share for the change in our explanatory
variables over our sample period based on estimates from specification (3) and (8) in Table
1 respectively. A negative (positive) sign in columns 3 and 5 indicates that the variable had
a negative (positive) impact on the wage share. The last two rows reports the change in
percentage points for the estimations indicated in the top row.
5.6 Comparison with results for selected OECD countries
We obtain considerable differences when comparing the results for Aus-
tria with estimation results for the other countries in our sample.61 We find
that globalisation had a strong impact on the wage share in all countries.
The effect of globalisation on the wage share was least strong in Denmark.
In Austria, Germany and, less robust, in the UK, the effect is due to out-
ward FDI as well as intermediate import penetration which reflects the im-
pact of international outsourcing practices. Intermediate imports penetra-
tion had no significant impact in Spain while FDI played a smaller role in
France and the US.
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Different institutional variables appear to be relevant for each country.
Germany exhibits the most robust positive effect of union density on the
wage share, and there is also some positive effect of union density in Aus-
tria, while collective bargaining coverage plays a more important role in
France and the UK together with social government spending.
Financialisation, as captured by household debt, had the most pro-
nounced effect in Austria, the UK and the US, while financial income ap-
pears to be relevant in Germany. Estimations for other countries are incon-
clusive and require analysis using data on a more disaggregated level.
We find mixed results for the effect of personal income inequality on the
wage share. However, there is indicative confirmation for a negative effect
in Austria, Germany and the UK.
While variables capturing technological change are significant in se-
lected specifications for Austria, Italy and the US, they do not appear to be
very robust to the application of different estimation techniques or the split
of the sample in services and manufacturing sectors. Furthermore, we do
not find strong evidence of skill-bias in terms the effect of technological
change, which constitutes the core of the mainstream explanation for in-
creasing inequality. For some specifications we observe that these vari-
ables are especially sensitive to the inclusion of country-level measures of
financialisation or bargaining power. However, these results are not robust
to the application of different estimation methodologies. This suggests that
while technological change surely has increased value added, the nega-
tive impact on the wage share is more likely to be an effect of reduced bar-
gaining power of workers, brought about by globalisation and a deteriora-
tion of bargaining conditions.
6. Conclusion
Our findings lend strong support to the political economy approach to
functional income distribution. Technological change had an impact, espe-
cially in Austria, Italy, the US, but the effects are not robust with respect to
the use of different specifications and the wage share in most countries in
our sample appears to be driven by different variables reflecting the bar-
gaining power of labour such as union density, adjusted bargaining cover-
age and government spending. Furthermore, we don’t find strong support
for the skill-biased technological change hypothesis which implies an ad-
verse effect for low skilled workers and a beneficial effect for high-skilled
workers. Indeed, the high significance of institutional variables suggests
that the negative effect of technological change on income distribution
stems from the fact that workers weren’t able to capture the gains of in-
creased productivity due to a weak bargaining position. In terms of eco-
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nomic significance, the decline in the wage share in Austria is most
strongly driven by a deterioration of bargaining power as captured by union
density and different measures of financialisation. However, the most rele-
vant institutional variables differ considerably across countries, lending
support to our approach of country specific estimations.
Our findings have important policy implications. Rising inequality is not
an inevitable outcome of technological change. Tackling income inequality
requires a restructuring of the institutional framework in which bargaining
takes place and a levelled play-ground where the bargaining power of la-
bour is more in balance with that of capital. The impact of globalisation is
likely to be significantly moderated or offset by stronger bargaining power
of labour via an improvement in union legislation, increasing the coverage
of collective bargaining, increasing the social wage via public goods and
social security and international labour standards embedded in a broader
strategy of global cooperation for high road labour market policies and
macroeconomic policy coordination. Each country would have to address
specific issues supporting the strongest positive drivers of the wage share
while mitigating factors that reduce workers’ bargaining power. Further-
more, our results suggest that a simple attempt to reduce income inequal-
ity through skill-upgrading will not work as skill-biased technological
change does not seem to be the most relevant factor determining the dis-
tribution between labour and capital.
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Abstract
There has been a significant decline in the share of wages in GDP in both developed and
developing countries since the 1980s. This paper analyses the determinants of the wage
share (labour compensation as a ratio to value added) using sectoral data for Austria, while
also comparing our results with selected OECD countries.
We compile a comprehensive sector-level dataset of nine OECD countries (Austria, Den-
mark, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, the UK, the US) for the period of 1970 to
2011, which allows us to trace the developments in the wage share across high and low
skilled sectors and within manufacturing and service industries.
Our findings lend strong support to the political economy approach to functional income
distribution. Technological change had an impact, especially in Austria, Italy, the US, but
the effects are not robust with respect to the use of different specifications and the wage
share in most countries in our sample appears to be driven by different variables reflecting
the bargaining power of labour such as union density, adjusted bargaining coverage and
government spending. The relevance of these variables differs considerably across coun-
tries, lending support to our approach of country specific estimations.
We find that globalisation had a strong impact on the wage share in all countries. The
effect of globalisation on the wage share was least strong in Denmark. In Austria, Germany,
and to a lesser extent in the UK, the effect is due to outward FDI and intermediate import
penetration which reflects the impact of international outsourcing practices. Intermediate
imports penetrations had no significant impact in Spain while FDI played a smaller role in
France and the US. Different institutional variables appear to be relevant for each country.
Germany exhibits the most robust positive effect of union density on the wage share, while
the decline in union density explains roughly 80 percent of the decline of the wage share in
Austria. Conversely, collective bargaining coverage, together with social government
spending, plays a more important role in France, the UK and the US. Financialisation had
the most pronounced effect in Austria, the UK and the US, while it appears to be also rele-
vant in Germany. We find mixed results for the effect of personal income inequality on the
wage share. However, there is indicative confirmation for a negative effect in Austria, Ger-
many, the UK and the US.
Zusammenfassung
Seit den Achtzigerjahren kam es zu einem signifikanten Rückgang der Lohnquote, also
des Lohnanteils am Bruttoinlandsprodukt, sowohl in den entwickelten als auch in den Ent-
wicklungsländern. In dieser Studie werden die Ursachen dieses Rückgangs anhand von
Branchendaten aus unterschiedlichsten OECD Staaten untersucht, wobei für Österreich
eine vertiefende Analyse erfolgt. Zunächst wird ein umfassender Branchendatensatz
erstellt, der Informationen von 1970 bis 2011 für neun OECD-Länder (Dänemark, Deutsch-
land, Frankreich, Italien, Österreich, Schweden, Spanien, UK und die USA) umfasst. Die
Verwendung von Branchen-Länderdaten erlaubt uns unterschiedliche Entwicklungen für
Sektoren mit hohen und geringen Qualifikationsanforderungen getrennt nach Fertigungs-
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und Dienstleistungsbereich zu analysieren. Durch Regressionsanalysen auf Länderebene
können wir auch die Auswirkungen von institutionellen Unterschieden hinsichtlich indus-
trieller Beziehungen oder des Entwicklungstandes des Sozialstaates auf die Lohnquoten in
den einzelnen Staaten untersuchen.
Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen einen starken Einfluss politischer und machtbedingter Ein-
flussfaktoren auf die Lohnquote und stützen somit Erklärungsmodelle die eine starke polit-
ökonomische Dimension aufweisen.
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